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“The responsibility of regional state actors in the sectarianization 
of the Syrian crisis should not  
be overstated.  Rather, it is the 
deeply sectarian character of the 
conflict that has imposed itself 
upon regional alignments  
and behaviors.”
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The Reluctant Sectarianism of Foreign 
States in the Syrian Conflict 
Summary
•	 The	Syrian	conlict’s	internal	dynamics	have	reshuled	regional	alignments	alongside	unprec-
edentedly	clear-cut	sectarian	dividing	lines;	this	has	often	occurred	against	the	preferences		
of	regional	state	actors	−	including	Saudi	Arabia	and	Iran.
•	 Foreign	states	have	generally	adopted	expedient	policies	that	followed	sectarian	patterns		
for	lack	of	alternatives.	
•	 Iran	bears	signiicant	responsibility	for	exacerbating	the	conlict’s	sectarian	character	at	the	
regional	level.
•	 There	is	no	such	“diplomatic	shortcut”	to	regional	appeasement;	it	is	the	domestic	Syrian	
deadlock	that	must	be	broken	in	order	to	alleviate	sectarian	tensions	across	the	Middle	East,	
not	the	opposite.
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Background
The	sectarian	character	of	the	Syrian	conlict	is	often	mischaracterized	as	having	been	fueled	by	regional	
state	actors	exploiting	sectarianism	to	advance	regional	agendas.	A	more	accurate	characterization	is	that	
the	Syrian	conlict’s	internal	dynamics	have	reshuled	regional	alignments	alongside	unprecedentedly	
clear-cut	sectarian	dividing	lines	and	that	this	has	often	occurred	against the	preferences	of	regional	state	
actors	−	including	Saudi	Arabia	and	Iran.	This	is	not	to	deny	that	regional	actors	sometimes	contributed	to	
deepening	the	sectarian	character	of	the	Syrian	conlict.	When	they	did	so,	however,	it	was	generally	as	a	
by-product	of	expedient	policies	that	followed	sectarian	patterns	for	lack	of	alternatives,	but	were	not	part	
of	a	deliberately	sectarian	agenda.	In	fact,	outside	of	Syria,	wholehearted	exploitation	of	sectarian	senti-
ments	in	relation	to	the	conlict	has	often	been	the	preserve	of	private	actors	that	are	not	constrained	by	
raison d’état,	in	particular	transnational	Sunni	(Salai)	and	Shia	networks..
The	extreme	level	of	sectarian	polarization	that	has	been	observed	in	Syria	from	early	2012	on	was	
largely	the	making	of	Syrians	themselves,	and	was	the	product,	in	particular,	of	a	regime	whose	policies	
have	been	characterized	by	decades	of	pro-Alawite	favoritism	in	the	army	and	security	forces,	manipu-
lation	of	the	minorities’	existential	fear	with	regard	to	the	Sunni	majority,	and	deliberate	radicalization	
of	Sunnis	through	massive	and	indiscriminate	violence.	Thus,	it	is	illusory	to	seek	the	causes	of	(and	
possible	solutions	to)	sectarian	radicalization	in	Syria	in	the	strategies	of	external	actors.	
Two	distinct	sectarian	coalitions	are	currently	opposing	each	other	in	the	regional	crisis	that	
centers	around	Syria:	on	the	one	hand,	a	pro-Assad	Shia	axis,	i.e.	Iran,	Maliki’s	Iraq,	Lebanon’s	Shia	
parties	and	Shia	foreign	ighters;	on	the	other	hand,	an	anti-Assad	Sunni	axis,	i.e.	Saudi	Arabia,	Qatar,	
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Turkey,	Jordan,	the	Lebanese	and	Iraqi	Sunni	oppositions,	and	non-state	Sunni	religious	and	militant	
transnational	networks.	The	homogeneous	nature	of	these	alignments	is	not	a	cause,	but	rather	a	
consequence	of	the	Syrian	crisis.	Indeed,	of	the	three	most	important	state	supporters	of	the	Syrian	
opposition	in	the	region,	that	is,	Saudi	Arabia,	Qatar,	and	Turkey,	only	the	irst	one	was	pursuing	a	
distinctly	“Sunni”	foreign	policy	before	2011,	as	both	Qatar	and	Turkey	used	to	have	excellent	relations	
with	Syria	and	Iran	at	that	time.	The	same	could	be	said	for	the	Palestinian	Hamas,	which	has	gradually	
distanced	itself	from	Damascus	and	Tehran	over	the	last	two	years.	Of	course,	the	pre-2011	anti-Iranian	
axis	(Saudi	Arabia,	Egypt,	Jordan)	was	homogeneously	Sunni,	but	none	of	its	components	behaved	
according	to	a	clear	sectarian	pattern	when	the	crisis	erupted	in	Syria,	because	sectarian	logics	were	
often	superseded	by	alternative	calculations.
Because	of	its	unrelenting	eforts	to	preserve	Alawite	rule	in	Syria,	and	because	of	its	mobilization	of	
Shia	militias	across	the	region	in	support	of	the	Assad	regime,	Iran	bears	a	signiicant	responsibility	for	
exacerbating	the	conlict’s	sectarian	character	−	not	so	much	inside	Syria,	where	sectarianism	is	deeply	
ingrained	anyway,	but	rather	at	the	regional	level.	To	a	certain	extent,	however,	this	ran	counter	to	the	
intentions	(and	interests)	of	Tehran,	whose	foreign	policy	has	always	been	ambivalent	in	its	relation	to	
sectarianism.	On	the	one	hand,	the	Islamic	Republic	has	constantly	tried	to	portray	itself	as	a	non-sectar-
ian	actor	in	order	to	maximize	its	appeal	among	the	region’s	predominantly	Sunni	populations.	On	the	
other	hand,	Iran’s	regional	strategy	has	acquired	a	distinctly	sectarian	lavor	because	Shia	networks	have	
proved	to	be	its	most	reliable	vehicles	of	inluence,	most	notably	in	Lebanon	and	Iraq,	and	because	of	
Tehran’s	partnership	with	Assad’s	Alawite	regime,	initially	a	mere	alliance	de	revers	against	Saddam’s	
Iraq.	This	ambivalence	explains	why	although	Iran	is	now	helping	Assad	to	ight	a	sectarian	war	against	
the	Sunni	insurgency,	it	has	refrained	from	oicially	embracing	a	sectarian	narrative	of	the	conlict.
The	Syrian	civil	war	saw	the	Islamic	Republic	crossing	a	new	threshold	in	its	sectarian	approach	to	
regional	politics,	namely,	the	mobilization	of	foreign	Shia	ighters	in	order	to	support	Assad’s	troops.	In	
particular,	the	Lebanese	Hezbollah’s	decisive	contribution	to	the	capture	of	al-Qusayr	by	the	regime	in	
June	2013	brought	anti-Shia	resentment	across	the	Muslim	world	to	unprecedented	levels.		However,	
Tehran’s	decision	to	recruit	sectarian	militias	was	a	last	resort,	long-resisted	move	that	was	not	dictated	
by	some	inherent	sectarian	drive.	Instead,	it	was	aimed	at	addressing	a	problem	stemming	from	the	
Syrian	conlict’s	sectarian	nature,	that	is,	the	regime’s	growing	lack	of	manpower.	The	recruitment	of	
foreign	Shia	ighters	was	only	one	aspect	of	a	broader	attempt	at	reinforcing	loyalist	forces	through	
the	establishment	(often	along	sectarian	patterns)	of	various	domestic	and	foreign	militias.1
Throughout	the	Syrian	crisis,	Saudi	Arabia	has	followed	an	opposite	course:	starting	from	a	more	
openly	sectarian	stance	than	that	of	Iran,	Riyadh	surprisingly	emerged,	until	a	very	recent	reorientation,	
as	the	chief	supporter	of	the	most	secular	segment	of	the	opposition.	
Over	the	past	decades,	Saudi	Arabia	has	encouraged	anti-Shia	propaganda	in	the	region	on	at	least	
three	occasions:	in	the	1980s,	in	order	to	curtail	the	appeal	of	the	Iranian	revolution;	after	2003,	in	order	
to	counter	the	rise	of	Iranian	inluence	in	Iraq,	Lebanon,	and	Syria;	2 		after	2011,	as	a	divide-and-rule	
strategy	aimed	at	preventing	the	revolutionary	wave	from	reaching	Gulf	societies.	3				However,	the	
Saudi	monarchy	does	not	need	to	manipulate	sectarian	sentiments	in	order	to	convince	its	subjects	of	
the	merits	of	supporting	the	Syrian	opposition,	a	stance	that	has	elicited	virtually	no	opposition	among	
Saudi	subjects.	In	fact,	Riyadh	perceives	the	exacerbation	of	sectarianism	as	a	result	of	the	brutalization	
of	the	Syrian	conlict	as	a	threat	because	it	stimulates	Islamic	activism	at	the	domestic	level.	This	is	
something	Saudi	authorities	do	not	want,	as	shown	by	their	crackdown	on	the	recruitment	of	volunteer	
ighters	and	on	private	fund-raising	initiatives	for	the	Syrian	rebels.	4  			The	reasons	for	this	reluctance	are	
many:	the	Saudi	rulers	want	(but	have	failed)	to	prevent	the	emergence	of	a	new	generation	of	Saudi	
jihadi	militants,	they	fear	the	possible	spread	of	revolutionary	ideas	inside	the	country,	and	they	have	
already	been	criticized	for	“not	doing	enough”	to	support	the	Syrians.
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Concerns	for	domestic	stability,	and	more	particularly	distrust	of	political	Islamic	movements	
(including	politicized	Salais),	also	encouraged	Saudi	Arabia	(as	well	as	Jordan,	after	months	of	
hesitation	due	to	fear	of	Syrian	retaliation	and	of	political	change	in	the	region)	to	support	the	least	
Islamist,	and	generally	least	sectarian,	segments	of	the	opposition.	Among	the	opposition	abroad,	
Riyadh	tried	to	counterbalance	the	inluence	of	the	Muslim	Brotherhood	by	supporting	a	coalition	
of	former	Baathists	(Riyad	Hijab,	Mustafa	al-Asad),	secular	intellectuals	(led	by	Christian	opposition	
leader	Michel	Kilo),	tribal	chiefs	(Ahmad	al-Jarba),	and	secular-leaning	representatives	of	the	Free	
Syrian	Army	(Luay	Miqdad).
On	the	ground,	Saudi	Arabia	favored	initiatives	aimed	at	organizing	the	insurgency	under	the	
aegis	of	defector	oicers,	among	the	least	religious	component	of	the	rebel	leadership.	As	recently	as	
last	August,	Riyadh’s	allies	in	the	opposition	put	forward	a	project	to	establish	“Syrian	National	Army”	
explicitly	aimed	at	countering	the	spread	of	“extremist	ideas”	among	the	military	opposition	to	Assad.	
5   In	the	absence	of	meaningful	Western	intervention	in	the	conlict,	therefore,	Saudi	and	Jordanian	
support	for	moderate	rebel	units	remained	the	only	obstacle	to	the	rise	of	their	more	radical	(and	
sectarian)	counterparts.	This	situation	only	changed	in	the	very	last	days	of	September	2013,	when	
the	Saudis	backed	the	establishment	of	two	new	Salai	coalitions	(the	Army	of	Islam	in	Damascus	and	
the	Army	of	the	Sunnis	in	Deir	ez-Zor).	That	was,	however,	an	expedient	move	driven	by	the	need	to	
set	up	a	counterweight	to	radical	jihadi	groups	like	the	Nusra	Front	and	the	Islamic	State	of	Iraq	and	
Sham.	The	latter’s	inluence	had	just	dramatically	increased	at	the	expense	of	the	Free	Syrian	Army,	
whose	pro-Western	stance	lost	much	of	its	currency	following	the	cancellation	of	announced	U.S.	
airstrikes	against	the	regime	earlier	that	month.6					
The	involvement	of	other	pro-opposition	state	actors	in	the	conlict	has	at	times	followed	a	
sectarian	pattern,	but	it	was	never	as	part	of	an	overall	sectarian	strategy.	Qatar	and	Turkey	initially	
did	their	best	to	save	Assad	from	his	own	obstinacy	by	ofering	to	broker	a	reasonable	deal	with	
the	opposition.	In	its	subsequent	support	for	the	latter,	Doha	has	tried	to	maximize	its	inluence	by	
cultivating	partners	of	various	obediences,	from	moderate	Islamists	like	the	Muslim	Brotherhood	to	
secular	igures	like	Suhayr	al-Atassi.	At	the	military	level,	Qatar	has	shown	much	less	reluctance	to	
back	Islamist	brigades	than	Saudi	Arabia,	but	not	for	ideological	reasons.	The	Emirate	rather	adopted	
an	opportunistic	approach	consisting	in	supporting	groups	that	had	already	asserted	their	credibility	
on	the	ground,	and,	as	importantly,	were	not	under	Saudi	inluence.	Turkey	has	turned	a	blind	eye	
on	the	activities	of	Jihadis	on	its	border,	but	in	the	sole	purpose	of	putting	military	pressure	on	the	
PKK.	As	for	the	recently	overthrown	Egyptian	government	of	Mohammed	Morsi,	it	purely	and	simply	
refrained	from	supporting	the	Syrian	opposition	as	a	result	of	its	rapprochement	with	Iran.	Only	two	
weeks	before	its	fall	did	Morsi	change	course	in	a	desperate	attempt	at	garnering	domestic	support.
Conclusion
The	responsibility	of	regional	state	actors	in	the	“sectarianization”	of	the	Syrian	crisis	should	not	
be	overstated.		Rather,	it	is	the	deeply	sectarian	character	of	the	conlict	that	has	imposed	itself	
upon	regional	alignments	and	behaviors.	Even	overtly	sectarian	moves,	such	as	Iran’s	decision	
to	send	foreign	Shia	volunteers	into	Syria,	were	the	product	of	a	domestic	Syrian	situation	that	
has	left	Tehran	with	little	room	for	non-sectarian	patterns	of	intervention.	Moreover,	on	the	other	
side	of	the	conlict,	Saudi	Arabia	long	resisted	the	temptation	to	support	the	most	blatantly	
sectarian	elements	of	the	opposition.	
Exaggerating	the	responsibility	of	regional	actors	in	the	worsening	of	the	conlict’s	sectarian	
character	may	be	tempting	for	Western	governments:	irst,	because	such	a	view	obscures	the	role	
their	own	shortcomings	have	played	in	the	deterioration	of	the	situation	in	Syria;	second,	because	it	
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gives	credibility	to	diplomatic	(versus	military)	options	by	suggesting	that	pressuring	regional	state	actors,	
and	particularly	Western	allies	is	key	to	the	attenuation	of	sectarian	tensions	in	Syria	and	the	region	at	
large.	There	is	no	such	“diplomatic	shortcut”	to	regional	appeasement;	it	is	the	domestic	Syrian	deadlock	
that	must	be	broken	in	order	to	alleviate	sectarian	tensions	across	the	Middle	East,	not	the	opposite.
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